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A	  veritable	  mix:	  veil-­‐piercing	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  company	  in	  liquidation,	  confiscation	  
orders	  and	  environmental	  pollution∗	  
	  
Although	   the	  excitement	  generated	  by	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	   in	  Prest	   v	  Petrodel	  
[2013]	  UKSC	  34	   (‘Prest’)	   in	   recent	  years	  has	  begun	   to	   fade,	   the	  emerging	   line	  of	   cases	  
considering	   the	   application	   of	   this	   authority	   has	   provided	   interesting	   insights	   into	   the	  
variety	  of	  factual	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  evasion	  or	  concealment	  principle	  might	  be	  
invoked.	  
	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  judgment	  in	  the	  recent	  case	  of	  R	  v	  Powell	  [2016]	  EWCA	  Crim	  1043	  
draws	  on	  the	  principles	   laid	  down	  in	  Prest	   to	  resolve	  a	  rather	  unusual	  question,	  that	   is	  
whether	  personal	   liability	   for	   the	  costs	  of	  cleaning	  up	  an	   insolvent	  company’s	  polluted	  
site	  could	  be	  imposed	  on	  two	  of	  its	  directors/shareholders	  under	  the	  Proceeds	  of	  Crime	  
Act	  2002	  (‘POCA	  2002’)	  confiscation	  procedures.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  could	  the	  controllers	  of	  
a	   company	   that	   had	   gone	   into	   liquidation	   be	   held	   liable	   to	   account	   for	   any	  monetary	  
gains	  which	   the	   company	   had	   derived	   from	   failing	   to	   honour	   its	   obligations	   regarding	  
the	  treatment	  of	  controlled	  waste?	  
	  
The	  facts	  of	  the	  matter	  may	  be	  outlined	  briefly	  as	  follows.	  Wormtech	  Ltd	  (‘W	  Ltd’)	  was	  
formed	   in	   2002,	   and	   the	   respondents	   JP	   and	   JW,	   who	   were	   both	   directors	   and	  
shareholders	  of	  W	  Ltd,	  exercised	  control	  over	  the	  company.	  The	  company	  was	  granted	  a	  
permit	  to	  recycle	  tonnes	  of	  food	  and	  green	  waste	  into	  compost	  at	  a	  site	  in	  South	  Wales.	  
There	  were	  repeated	  breaches	  of	  the	  permit,	  and	  by	  the	  time	  the	  site	  was	  found	  to	  have	  
been	  abandoned	  in	  2012,	  hundreds	  of	  tonnes	  of	  food	  waste	  were	  rotting	  and	  leachate	  
was	  overflowing.	  A	  winding	  up	  order	  was	  made	  against	  W	  Ltd,	  but	  it	  fell	  to	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  Defence	  (apparently	  as	  owner	  of	  the	  land)	  and	  the	  public	  purse	  to	  clean	  up	  the	  site,	  at	  
a	  cost	  of	  approximately	  £1.125	  million.	  	  
	  
W	   Ltd	  was	   initially	   charged,	   together	  with	   JP	   and	   JW,	  with	   offences	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  
pollution	   of	   the	   site.	   However,	   the	   prosecution	   of	  W	   Ltd	   fell	   away,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  
permission	   to	   continue	   proceedings	   following	   its	   entry	   into	   liquidation.	   The	   failure	   to	  
convict	  the	  company	  itself	  of	  any	  offences	  and	  secure	  any	  financial	  recovery	  attendant	  
on	  the	  conviction	  of	  W	  Ltd,	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  even	  more	  important	  to	  recover	  some	  of	  
the	  costs	  incurred	  in	  cleaning	  up	  the	  site	  by	  means	  of	  the	  personal	  liability	  ascribed	  to	  JP	  
and	   JW	   as	   controllers	   of	   the	   company.	   	   JP	   and	   JW	   were	   convicted	   of	   consenting	   or	  
conniving	   as	   a	   director	   in	   W	   Ltd’s	   failure	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   conditions	   of	   its	  
environmental	  permit,	  and	  consenting	  or	   conniving	  as	  a	  director	   in	  W	  Ltd’s	  offence	  of	  
involving	  the	  treatment,	  storage	  and	  disposal	  of	  controlled	  waste	   in	  a	  manner	   likely	  to	  
cause	  pollution	  (JW	  pleaded	  guilty	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  W	  Ltd’s	  offence	  was	  attributable	  to	  
his	  neglect,	  rather	  than	  his	  consent	  or	  connivance).	  In	  addition	  to	  imprisonment,	  unpaid	  
work	   and	   disqualification	   as	   a	   director	   for	   5	   years,	   confiscation	   and	   	   compensation	  
orders	  under	  the	  POCA	  2002	  were	  made	  against	  both	  JP	  and	  JW	  by	  the	  Crown	  Court.	  	  
	  
The	  Crown	  (representing	  Natural	  Resources	  Wales)	  applied	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  for	  an	  
upward	  variation	  of	  the	  confiscation	  orders	  of	  £200,000	  and	  £30,000	  granted	  against	  JP	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and	   JW	  respectively.	   Its	  argument	  was	   that	   the	  costs	  of	  disposing	  of	   the	  waste	   left	  on	  
the	   site	   would	   have	   been	   shouldered	   by	   W	   Ltd	   if	   it	   had	   continued	   trading.	   As	   the	  
company	  had	  kept	  the	  controlled	  waste	  on	  the	  site	  in	  a	  manner	  likely	  to	  cause	  pollution,	  
it	   had	   a	   responsibility	   to	   clear	   up	   the	   site	   and	   had	   succeeded	   in	   avoiding	   the	   cost	   of	  
doing	  so	  by	  abandoning	  the	  site.	   	  Hence,	  based	  on	  s.6(4)(c)	   	  and	  s.76	   	  POCA	  2002,	  the	  
pecuniary	  advantage	  derived	  by	  W	  Ltd	  by	  virtue	  of	  not	  meeting	  the	  costs	  of	  cleaning	  up	  
the	  site	  should	  be	  attributed	  to	  JP	  and	  JW	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  confiscation	  order	  equivalent	  
to	  the	  sum	  avoided.	  Consideration	  was	  given	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  following	  test	  
from	  R	  v	  Seager	  &	  Blatch	   [2010]	  1	  Cr	  App	  R	   (S)	  60,	   [76]	   could	  be	  applied	   in	  a	  manner	  
which	  was	  consistent	  with	  Prest:	  
	  
In	   the	  context	  of	   criminal	   cases	   the	  courts	  have	   identified	  at	   least	   three	  
situations	  when	   the	   corporate	   veil	   can	   be	   pierced…	   Secondly,	  where	   an	  
offender	  does	  acts	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  company	  which	  	  (with	  the	  necessary	  
mens	   rea)	   constitute	   a	   criminal	   offence	   which	   leads	   to	   the	   offender’s	  
conviction,	  then	  ‘the	  veil	  of	  incorporation	  is	  not	  so	  much	  pierced	  as	  rudely	  
torn	   away’:	   per	   Lord	   Bingham	   in	   Jennings	   v	   CPS	   [	   [2008]	   	   Cr	   App	   R	   29]	  
paragraph	  16	  
	  	  
The	  parties	  had	  no	  difficulty	  in	  accepting	  that	  this	  case	  could	  not	  be	  brought	  within	  the	  
concealment	  principle.	  However,	  it	  was	  less	  clear	  whether	  it	  fell	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
evasion	  principle	  articulated	  by	  Lord	  Sumption	  in	  Prest.	   It	  was	  evident	  from	  the	  nature	  
of	  the	  criminality	  involved	  that	  there	  was	  no	  façade	  or	  attempt	  to	  hide	  behind	  W	  Ltd’s	  
structure	   in	  a	  way	   that	  abused	   the	  shield	  provided	  by	   the	  corporate	   form.	   	  W	  Ltd	  had	  
not	  been	  run	  for	  an	  unlawful	  purpose,	  but	  was	   in	  fact	  a	   legitimate	  business	  which	  had	  
breached	   the	   criminal	   law	   through	   its	   failure	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   relevant	   regulations.	  	  
The	   company’s	   purpose	   following	   its	   founding	   in	   2002	   had	   been	   the	   disposal	   of	   food	  
waste.	  To	  this	  end,	  it	  had	  obtained	  the	  necessary	  permits	  and	  incurred	  significant	  costs	  
to	   install	   the	   infrastructure	   required	   to	   comply	   with	   its	   obligations,	   for	  modest	   profit	  
margins.	   It	  was	  thus	   ‘a	   lawful	  operation	  which	  had	  become	  unlawful	  through	  breaches	  
of	  conditions’.	  JP,	  in	  addition	  to	  making	  substantial	  personal	  investments	  into	  W	  Ltd,	  had	  
guaranteed	   the	   company’s	   overdraft	   and	   finance	   agreements.	   Ultimately,	   she	   had	  
suffered	  a	  large	  financial	  loss	  on	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  company.	  Similarly,	  JW	  had	  provided	  
guarantees	  for	  the	  company’s	  debts.	  It	  was	  also	  noted	  that	  JP	  and	  JW	  were	  not	  the	  sole	  
shareholders	  of	  W	  Ltd,	  a	  factor	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  deciding	  whether	  JP	  and	  JW	  
should	  in	  law	  be	  treated	  as	  having	  gained	  the	  pecuniary	  advantage	  arising	  from	  W	  Ltd’s	  
failure	  to	  clear	  up	  the	  polluted	  site.	  	  
	  
	  
Applying	  the	  Prest	  evasion	  principle	  that	  the	  corporate	  veil	  may	  be	  disregarded	  ‘if	  there	  
is	   a	   legal	   right	   against	   the	   person	   in	   control	   of	   it	   which	   exists	   independently	   of	   the	  
company’s	   involvement,	   and	   a	   company	   is	   interposed	   so	   that	   the	   separate	   legal	  
personality	   of	   the	   company	   will	   defeat	   the	   right	   or	   frustrate	   its	   enforcement’,	   it	   was	  
clear	   that	   there	   should	   be	   a	   legal	   right	   against	   the	   persons	   controlling	   the	   company	  
which	   stood	   independently	   of	   the	   company’s	   involvement,	   as	   exemplified	   by	   the	  
restrictive	   covenant	   in	  Gilford	   v	  Horne	   [1933]	   Ch.	   935.	   In	   this	   particular	   case,	   no	   legal	  
right,	   liability,	   obligation	   or	   restriction	   could	   be	   identified	   with	   respect	   to	   JP	   and	   JW,	  
which	   existed	   independently	   of	  W	   Ltd.	   It	   was	   the	   company	   itself	   which	   had	   incurred	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obligations	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  relevant	  environmental	  laws	  when	  it	  secured	  the	  permit.	  	  
The	   criminal	   liability	   of	   JP	   and	   JW	   arose	   in	   a	   secondary	   manner	   through	   the	   familiar	  
device	  of	  attaching	  criminal	  responsibility	  to	  senior	  managers	  and	  officers	  of	  a	  company	  
in	   circumstances	  where	   the	  elements	  of	   consent,	   connivance	  and	  neglect	   are	  present,	  
and	  the	  material	  legislation	  provides	  accordingly.	  W	  Ltd	  could	  not	  therefore	  be	  seen	  to	  
have	  been	  interposed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  use	  its	  separate	  legal	  personality	  to	  defeat	  or	  
frustrate	   the	   enforcement	   of	   particular	   rights	   against	   JP	   and	   JW.	   These	  were	   the	  only	  
circumstances	   in	   which	   the	   legal	   personality	   of	   a	   company	   could	   be	   disregarded	   in	  
favour	   of	   imposing	   liability	   on	   parties	   in	   the	   position	   of	   JP	   and	   JW	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
procedures	  such	  as	  	  those	  	  related	  to	  confiscation.	  	  The	  court	  was	  careful	  to	  emphasise	  
that	  	  ‘decisions	  of	  this	  sort	  in	  the	  context	  of	  confiscation	  proceedings	  must	  be	  geared	  to	  
the	   facts	   and	   circumstances	   of	   the	   particular	   case’.	   The	   facts	   of	   this	   particular	   case	  
negated	   any	   suggestion	   that	   it	   fell	   within	   the	   category	   of	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   benefit	  
obtained	  by	  the	  company	  should	  be	  treated	  in	  law	  as	  a	  benefit	  obtained	  by	  an	  individual	  
criminal	  under	  POCA	  2002.	  Consequently,	  no	  personal	   liability	  for	  the	  costs	  of	  cleaning	  
up	  W	  Ltd’s	  polluted	  site	  could	  be	  attached	  to	  JP	  and	  JW	  under	  POCA	  2002	  confiscation	  
procedures,	  and	  the	  Crown’s	  application	  was	  refused.	  
	  
This	   case	   is	   a	   good	   illustration	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   application	   of	   the	   evasion	  
principle	  is	  being	  tested,	  particularly	  in	  circumstances	  where	  liability	  of	  a	  criminal	  nature	  
arises.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal’s	  judgment	  adds	  weight	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  qualification	  
in	  Prest	   that	   the	   evasion	  principle	   should	   be	   applied	  only	   in	   rare	   cases.	   The	  notion	  of	  
evasion	  will	  evidently	  not	  be	  taken	  at	  face	  value	  where	  a	  closely-­‐held	  company	  has	  gone	  
into	   liquidation,	   leaving	   significant	   environmental	   damage	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   its	   collapse.	  
Hence,	   from	  an	  environmental	   protection	  perspective,	   the	  outcome	   signifies	   that	   veil-­‐
piercing	  will	   not	   feature	   among	   the	   techniques	  which	   are	   open	   to	   the	   authorities	   for	  
pursuing	  unfortunate	  (rather	  than	  dishonest)	  operators	  to	  recover	  the	  costs	  of	  any	  State	  
intervention	  to	  clean	  up	  polluted	  sites.	  While	  this	  adherence	  to	  the	  restrictive	  approach	  
laid	  down	  in	  Prest	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  victory	  for	  consistency	  in	  this	  area	  of	  law,	  there	  
is	  still	  work	  to	  be	  done	  in	  terms	  of	  ensuring	  that	  the	  environmental	  and	  financial	  costs	  of	  
such	  pollution	  are	  not	  shifted	  onto	  the	  public	  in	  consequence	  of	  a	  company’s	  insolvency	  
and	   the	   inability	   to	   hold	   its	   controlling	   shareholders	   to	   account	   for	   the	   company’s	  
breaches	  of	  environmental	  law.	  
